Workshops

Fall 2015

Complexity and Simplicity in Economics

Oct 12, 2015 to Oct 16, 2015

Return to event »

Click on the titles of individual talks for abstract, slides and archived video (available approximately one week after the conclusion of the workshop).

Please note that this schedule is subject to change. All events take place in the Calvin Lab Auditorium.

Monday, October 12th, 2015
9:30 am–9:50 am		Coffee and Check-In
9:50 am–10:00 am		Opening Remarks
10:00 am–10:45 am		The Emergent Structure of Simple Behaviors in Complex Networks Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research New England
10:45 am–11:15 am		Break
11:15 am–11:45 am		Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings Shuchi Chawla, University of Wisconsin-Madison
11:45 am–12:15 pm		Timing “Versus” Matching: Thickness and Information in Dynamic Markets Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University
12:15 pm–2:00 pm		Lunch
2:00 pm–2:45 pm		On Maximizing Revenue for Multi-Item Auctions Andrew Yao, Tsinghua University
2:45 pm–3:15 pm		Break
3:15 pm–3:45 pm		Simple Mechanisms for a (Sub)Additive Buyer Matt Weinberg, Princeton University
3:45 pm–4:15 pm		Algorithmic Bayesian Mechanism Design Yang Cai, McGill University
4:15 pm–5:15 pm		Reception

Tuesday, October 13th, 2015
9:30 am–10:00 am		Coffee and Check-In
10:00 am–10:45 am		The Substitution Metric and the Performance of Clock Auctions Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
10:45 am–11:15 am		Break
11:15 am–11:45 am		Privacy, Substitutes, and Optimization in Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions Ilya Segal, Stanford University
11:45 am–12:15 pm		Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Shengwu Li, Stanford University
12:15 pm–2:00 pm		Lunch
2:00 pm–2:45 pm		Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
2:45 pm–3:15 pm		Econometrics for Learning Agents Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research
3:15 pm–3:45 pm		Break
3:45 pm–4:45 pm		Group Discussion about Future Directions

Wednesday, October 14th, 2015
9:30 am–10:00 am		Coffee and Check-In
10:00 am–10:45 am		Smoothness and Pricing: Near-Optimal Outcomes in Markets Large and Small Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research
10:45 am–11:15 am		Break
11:15 am–11:45 am		Complexity in AGT Update: Nash Approximability and Simultaneous Auctions Christos Papadimitriou, UC Berkeley
11:45 am–12:15 pm		Competition and Simple Auctions Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania
12:15 pm–2:00 pm		Lunch
2:00 pm–2:45 pm		Consensus Expectations and Conventions Ben Golub, Harvard University
2:45 pm–3:15 pm		Break
3:15 pm–3:45 pm		Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups Sigal Oren, Ben Gurion University
3:45 pm–4:15 pm		Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Platforms Ashish Goel, Stanford University

Thursday, October 15th, 2015
9:30 am–10:00 am		Coffee and Check-In
10:00 am–10:45 am		First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue Ben Brooks, University of Chicago
10:45 am–11:15 am		Break
11:15 am–11:45 am		The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
11:45 am–12:15 pm		On the Borders of Border’s Theorem Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
12:15 pm–2:00 pm		Lunch
2:00 pm–2:30 pm		Strong Duality for a Multiple Good Monopolist Christos Tzamos, MIT
2:30 pm–3:00 pm		Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Mechanism Design Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
3:00 pm–3:30 pm		Break
3:30 pm–4:30 pm		Panel Discussion

Friday, October 16th, 2015
9:30 am–10:00 am		Coffee and Check-In
10:00 am–10:45 am		Selling Experiments Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
10:45 am–11:15 am		Break
11:15 am–11:45 am		The Sample Complexity of Revenue Maximization Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
11:45 am–12:15 pm		How Well Do Prices Coordinate Markets Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania
12:15 pm–2:00 pm		Lunch
2:00 pm–2:30 pm		Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination Nima Haghpanah, MIT
2:30 pm–3:00 pm		Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation Shahar Dobzinski, Weizmann Institute of Science