Breakout Session Track #1

Speaker: Vanessa Teague, University of Melbourne

Title: End-to-end verifiable voting in a state election

Abstract: Electronic voting computations clearly need to be verifiable, in the sense of providing a public proof that all encrypted votes have been correctly counted. The e-voting literature also includes interesting protocols for ensuring that a voter (who cannot perform cryptographic computations directly) can nevertheless gain some evidence that her vote has been cast as she intended. We describe a system with both these kinds of verifiability, based on the Prêt à Voter end-to-end verifiable voting system. The system ran successfully in the state election in Victoria (Australia) in November 2014, taking a total of 1121 votes from supervised polling places inside Victoria and overseas.

Joint work with Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, Peter Y A Ryan and Steve Schneider.

Breakout Session Track #2

Brief Announcements

Breakout Session Track #3

Brief Announcements