

# On Synthesising Probabilistic Models and Programs

**Joost-Pieter Katoen** 

joint with Milan Češka, Roman Andriushchenko, Sebastian Junges



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### How to Pick the Optimal Bias?



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A distributed algorithm is self-stabilising iff:

## Convergence:

Starting from an arbitrary state, it always converges to a legitimate state

## Closure:

And it remains in a legitimate set of states thereafter in absence of faults

## A self-stabilising algorithm:

- Works correctly for every initialisation
- Recovers from the occurrence of transient faults

A key concept in fault-tolerant distributed computing

Dijkstra 1986: Self-stabilisation in anonymous networks is impossible

### Herman's escape 1990: use randomisation



Edsger W. Dijkstra



Ted Herman

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#### Herman's Randomised Self-Stabilisation

- ▶ *N*+1 (odd) synchronous processes 0, . . . , *N* form a directed ring
- Process i has a Boolean variable x<sub>i</sub> ∈ {0, 1}
- Processes have access to their neighbour's variables



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Process *i* performs:
if 
$$x_i = x_{i-1}$$
, then  $x_i \coloneqq \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } p \\ 1 & \text{with probability } 1-p \end{cases}$ 
if  $x_i \neq x_{i-1}$  then  $x_i \coloneqq x_{i-1}$ 

Process possesses token if  $x_i$  equals  $x_{i-1}$ 

Performance metric = expected convergence time

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#### **A Round of Herman's Protocol**



### **Another Round**



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N+1	#states	#trans	p	ECT	time(s)
7	129	2,316	[0.496, 0.504]	[4.493, 4.493]	2.68
9	513	21K	[0.452, 0.465], [0.535, 0.548]	[7.914, 7.921]	4.5
11	2,049	180K	[0.352, 0.382], [0.618, 0.648]	[12.097, 12.102]	9.1
13	8,193	1.6M	[0.322, 0.344], [0.656, 0.678]	[16.942, 16.949]	36.1
15	32,769	14.4M	[0.301, 0.319], [0.681, 0.699]	[22.445, 22.453]	310
17	131,073	129M	[0.291, 0.304], [0.696, 0.709]	[28.603, 28.610]	3480
19	524,289	1,162M	[0.279, 0.292], [0.708, 0.721]	[35.406, 35.416]	> 24h

#### Abstraction-refinement of parameter regions

### **Iterative Parameter Synthesis**



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### **Parameter Synthesis Results**



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## We can automatically synthesise the parameter values that minimise the expected convergence time

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### **Uncountable sets of finite Markov chains**



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#### **Uncountable sets of finite Markov chains**

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## What if we allow for topology changes?

### Thus: focus on tweaking the control structure

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### **Model Synthesis**



#### Huge, finite sets of finite Markov chains

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Inputs:

a Markov chain family + a property f eg. can G be reached with probability > p?



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#### **Cost-based variants:**

- 4. Find the cheapest realisation satisfying *f*.
- 5. Find all within-budget realisations satisfying f.





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### **Objective: Partition Parameter Space**



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Fix the parameters, build the model, check



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### The "All-in-One" Approach



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#### The "All-in-One" Approach



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Build the union (linear blow-up), apply model checking and extract result

Exploit regularity with symbolic methods

Probabilistic model checking slow, already on moderate family sizes

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#### **Use Abstraction**



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### "Forget" The Realisation We Are In



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This yields a quotient MDP

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#### **Abstraction Refinement: CEGAR**



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Full Situation

Algorithm's Perspective



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Quotient may be much larger than any family member

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				probabilities		edges	
model	instance	states	transitions	λ	$\Pr^+(\Diamond T)$	$ E^* $	E
coin	(2, 2)	272	492	0.30	0.56	8	14
	(4, 4)	43,136	144,352	0.30	0.54	17	28
	(6, 2)	1,258,240	6,236,736	0.30	0.59	≥ 16	42
csma	(2, 4)	7,958	10,594	0.50	> 0.99	36	38
	(2, 6)	66,718	93,072	0.50	> 0.99	36	42
	(4, 2)	761,962	1,327,068	0.40	0.78	≥ 43	72
firewire	(3)	4,093	5,585	0.50	1	24	64
	(12)	22,852	40,904	0.50	1	24	64
	(36)	212,268	481,792	0.50	1	24	64
wlan	(2, 2)	28,598	57,332	0.10	0.18	33	70
	(4, 4)	345,120	762,422	4e-4	7.9e-4	39	76
	(6, 6)	5,007,670	11,475,920	1e-7	2.2e-7	43	80

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Property: If a sub-MC of MC *D* refutes the safety property *f*, then *D* refutes *f* too.

## The Best of Both Worlds



## **The Best of Both Worlds**



Implemented in Python, using Z3 and the probabilistic model checker Storm

- Implementation on top of Python API of Storm
- Takes PRISM or JANI file with open integer constants

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stormchecker.org CAV 2017

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Why Storm?

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stormchecker.org CAV 2017

#### Why Storm?

The 2019 Comparison of Tools for the Analysis of Quantitative Formal Models (QComp 2019 Competition Report)

> TACAS 2019 ISOLA 2020

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stormchecker.org

**CAV 2017** 



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[Benini et al, IEEE CAD 1999]



dtmc

const int H; const int K;

```
module example
    s : [0..11] init 0;
    [] s=0 -> 1: (s'=H);
    [] s=1 -> 0.5:(s'=7) + 0.5:(s'=8);
    //...
    [] s=7 -> 0.8:(s'=K) + 0.2:(s'=2);
    [] s=8 -> 1: (s'=K);
    //...
endmodule
```



### Challenge

- Synthesise guards and updates in DPM control program with 9 holes
- Specification = conjunction of expected #lost reqs and energy consumption



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### **Results (16 parameters)**

- Family size = 43,000,000 control programs of average size of 3,600 states
- Our approach: 9 hours; baseline: > 1 month



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# Determining an optimal *positional* strategy for reachability is ETR-complete

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This is as hard as finding the real roots of a polynomial

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Practice: determine randomised finite-state controllers with bounded memory

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Minimise the expected #steps to exit the maze



22 parameters

- 9,400,000 possible strategies
- 200 states average MC size

Minimise the expected #steps to exit the maze



Minimise the expected #steps to exit the maze

- 22 parameters
- 9,400,000 possible strategies
- 200 states average MC size

- baseline: about two days
- our approach: 1 hour









Can we do better? Use a single bit of memory and 25 different coin biases

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# Can we do better? Use a single bit of memory and 25 different coin biases

- 7 parameters
- 3,100,000 possible strategies
- 1,100 states average MC size





## Can we do better? Use a single bit of memory and 25 different coin biases

- 7 parameters
- 3,100,000 possible strategies
- 1,100 states average MC size

- baseline: about 1,5 days
- our approach: 17 minutes





# Can we do better? Use a single bit of memory and 25 different coin biases

- 7 parameters
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- our approach: 17 minutes

Initially use most fair coins, memory 0, and later highly unfair coins, memory 1

### Applications:

- ✓ Program sketching
- Controller synthesis in partially observable systems
- ✓ Software product lines
- Randomised distributed computing
- Approaches: CEGAR, CEGIS and their combination

#### • Further work:

- ✓ Other refinement strategies
- ✓ Other models: MDPs, POMDPs, .....
- ✓ Infinite families, infinite-state realisations, .....

### • Further details:

LNCS 10500 (Festschrift Scott Smolka), TACAS 2019+21, FM 2019

# **PAYNT (Probabilistic progrAm sYNThesizer)**



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