Rational Synthesis



Orna Kupferman

Hebrew University

Joint work with Shaull Almagor, Dana Fisman, Yoad Lustig, Giuseppe Perelli, and Moshe Y. Vardi

Is the system correct?



Synthesis:

Input: a specification ψ.

Output: a system satisfying ψ.

Is the system correct?

Yes! it satisfies its specification.

Synthesis:

Input: a specification ψ.

Output: a system satisfying ψ.

Input: $p \wedge q$.

Output: p, q



An example:

user 1

user 2

1. Whenever user i sends a job, the job is eventually printed.
2. The printer does not serve the two users simultaneously.

AP={j1,j2,p1,p2}

1. $G(j1 \rightarrow F\ p1) \wedge G(j2 \rightarrow F\ p2)$
2. $G((\neg p1) \vee (\neg p2))$

Let's synthesize a scheduler that satisfies the specification ψ…

Satisfiability of ψ ⇒ such a scheduler exists?

NO!

A model for ψ ⇒ help in constructing a scheduler?

NO!



A model for ψ: a scheduler that is guaranteed to satisfy ψ for some input sequence.

Wanted: a scheduler that is guaranteed to satisfy ψ for all input sequences.

Closed vs. open systems

Closed system: no input!



all input sequences=some input sequence



Closed vs. open systems

Open system: interacts with an environment!

o_0

$o_1=f(i_0)$

$o_2=f(i_0,i_1)$

$o_3=f(i_0,i_1,i_2)$



i_0

i_1

i_2

$AP=I\cup O$

An open system: ~~$f:(2^I)^* \rightarrow 2^O$~~

starategy

$f:(2^I)^* \rightarrow 2^O$ is a regular strategy if for all $\sigma \in 2^O$, the set of words $w \in (2^I)^*$ for which $f(w)=\sigma$ is regular.

Regular strategies → Finite-state transducers



Closed vs. open systems

Open system: $f:(2^{I})^{*} \rightarrow 2^{O}$

In the printer example: $I=\{j1,j2\}$, $O=\{p1,p2\}$

$$f:(\{\{\},\{j1\},\{j2\},\{j1,j2\}\})^{*} \rightarrow \{\{\},\{p1\},\{p2\},\{p1,p2\}\}$$



A computation of f:



$(f(\varepsilon)) \rightarrow (i_0,f(i_0)) \rightarrow (i_1,f(i_0,i_1)) \rightarrow (i_2,f(i_0,i_1,i_2)) \rightarrow \ldots$

The specification ψ is realizable if there is $f:(2^I)^* \rightarrow 2^O$ such that all the computations of f satisfy ψ.



An open system is correct if it satisfies its specification in all environments.

Too strong: Add assumptions on the environment (behavioral or structural).

Rational synthesis: the components that compose the environment have their own objectives and are rational. [Fisman, Lustig, Kupferman 2010]

An example:



User 1 can download only when User 2 uploads.

User 2 can download only when User 1 uploads.

Both users want to download infinitely often.

$\varphi_1 = GF(d_1 \wedge u_2)$

$\varphi_2 = GF(d_2 \wedge u_1)$

φ_1 is not realizable:

- fails when User 2 never uploads.

An example:



$\varphi_1 = GF(d_1 \wedge u_2)$

$\varphi_2 = GF(d_2 \wedge u_1)$

User 1 to User 2: I will upload, and will continue to upload as long as you upload.

A rational User 2 will upload forever, enabling User 1 to satisfy φ_1.

Rational Synthesis [FKL10]



$X = X_0 \cup \ldots \cup X_k$

P_i assigns values to X_i

Input: objectives ψ and $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k$.

Output: a stable profile $\langle f_0, \ldots, f_k \rangle$ that satisfies ψ.

$P_1 \ldots P_k$ have no incentive to deviate

Cooperative Rational Synthesis [FKL10]

Input: objectives ψ and $\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_k$.

Output: a stable profile $\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k\rangle$ that satisfies ψ.

We can suggest a strategy to the enviroment...

Cooperative Rational Synthesis [FKL10]

Input: objectives ψ and $\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_k$.

Output: a stable profile $\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$ that satisfies ψ.

Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis [KPV13]

Input: objectives ψ and $\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_k$.

Output: a strategy f_0 such that every stable profile $\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$ satisfies ψ.

How different they are?

Algorithmic Game Theory

A network

(b) locations.

↘ communication channels.

↘ 6 cost of creating the channel.



A network formation game

[Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler, Roughgarden 2004]

b locations.

communication channels.

6 cost of creating the channel.





Players that need to transmit messages between locations in the network.

A network formation game: example

Two players need to transmit messages from s

Player 1  needs to reach a

Player 2  needs to reach b



A network formation game: example

Two players need to transmit messages from s

Player 1  needs to reach a

Player 2  needs to reach b

The strategy space of  :

{ {⟨s,v⟩,⟨v,a⟩} , {⟨s,a⟩} }



A network formation game: example

Two players need to transmit messages from s

Player 1  needs to reach a

Player 2  needs to reach b

The strategy space of  :

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The strategy space of  :

{ {⟨s,b⟩} , {⟨s,v⟩, ⟨v,b⟩} }



A profile is a choice of strategy for each player.

Four possible profiles in our example:





What are the payments?

A profile is a choice of strategy for each player.

Four possible profiles in our example:





What are the payments?

A profile is a choice of strategy for each player.

Four possible profiles in our example:





What are the payments?

How is a cost shared?

Players that use the same channel share its cost:



$$\frac{8}{2}+2=6$$

$$\frac{8}{2}+1=5$$



A profile is a choice of strategy for each player.

Four possible profiles in our example:





Best response dynamics (BRD):

- A local search method: in each step some player is chosen and plays his best-response strategy, given the strategies of the others.

- BRD converges when no player wants to change his strategy.

Best response dynamics.

Example: starting from 

Cost for  :10

Cost for  :7

, want to change strategy?

No, 7 < 10

, want to change strategy?

Sure ,9 < 10 



Best response dynamics.

Cost for  :9

Cost for  :7

, want to change strategy?

Yes, 6 < 7



Best response dynamics.

Cost for  :5

Cost for  :6

, want to change strategy?

No, 5 < 10

, want to change strategy?

No, 6 < 7



 

BRD halts, we've reached a stable profile.

Nash Equilibria (NE): a profile of strategies such that no player can benefit from changing to another strategy (assuming the other players stay with their strategies).



BRD halts, we've reached a stable profile.

Interesting questions:

- Does best response dynamics always converge?

Yes! In all network formation games.

Proof: potential functions.

If profile P' is obtained by applying a best-response in profile P, then $\Phi(P') < \Phi(P)$.

Interesting questions:

- Does best response dynamics always converge?

- Will we reach a good Nash equilibrium?

What is "good"?

Social optimum (SO): minimizes the sum of the payments of all players together.

Good: equal (or at least close) to the social optimum.

How much do we lose from the absence of a centralized authority?

In our example:



SO = NE = 11

Interesting questions:

Will we reach a good Nash equilibrium?

Payments of the players in an NE

Payments of the players in a SO





An NE may not be good!



An NE may not be good!

- k players, all want to route from s to t
- All k players start in the channel that costs k.



Each player pays $\frac{k}{k}=1$

An NE may not be good!





- No one wants to switch!

A very bad NE.

Price of Anarchy = k

PoA: worst NE / SO.

An NE may not be good!



Now I am paying 1.
If I switch I would
need to pay 1+ε

- No one wants to switch!

A very bad NE.

Price of Anarchy = k

- But, a good NE does exist.

Does there always exist a good NE?

Does there always exist a good NE?

For every network formation game, there exists a good NE – one whose cost is at most $H_k \cdot SO$.

$$H_0 = 0,$$
$$H_k = 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \dots + \frac{1}{k} \approx \ln k$$

Price of stability: best NE / SO.

H_k is tight…

Does there always exist a good NE?

Four players want to route in the following network:



Does there always exist a good NE?

Four players want to route in the following network:

Each player has two possible strategies:
A direct edge or via the vertex at the bottom.



Does there always exist a good NE?

A profile that attains the social optimum:

Note: it costs $1+\varepsilon$.



In this profile each player pays $\frac{1}{4}+\varepsilon$.

Does there always exist a good NE?

A profile that attains the social optimum:

But this is not an NE!



Does there always exist a good NE?





Player 4

Does there always exist a good NE?



Does there always exist a good NE?





Player 3

Does there always exist a good NE?



Does there always exist a good NE?





Player 2

Does there always exist a good NE?



Does there always exist a good NE?



Damn, they left me alone with the 1+ε…

Player 1

Does there always exist a good NE?



Player 1

Does there always exist a good NE?



The price of the only stable (NE) profile:

$$1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{4}$$

There is no good NE!

So, network formation games:



- Players have reachability objectives.
- Players that share a channel, share its cost.

- Nash Equilibrium (NE): a stable profile in which no player has an incentive to change his strategy – always exists in network formation games.
- Social Optimum (SO): a profile that minimizes the players' payments.

- Price of anarchy: worst NE/SO.
  PoA=k in network formation games.
- Price of stability: best NE /SO.
  PoS = $H_k \approx \log k$ in network formation games.

BTW: [Avni, Kupferman, Tamir, 2013]



- Players may have regular objectives (in a labeled network).
- Strategies: paths that need not be simple.
- Players that share a channel, share its cost proportionally.

- An NE need not exists
- PoS=PoA=k.
- ...

Back to Rational Synthesis

A stable (NE) profile $P = \langle f_0, \ldots, f_k \rangle$:

for every i, if φ_i is not satisfied in P, then φ_i is not satisfied also in $P[i \leftarrow f'_i] = \langle f_0, \ldots f'_i, \ldots, f_k \rangle$, for all alternative strategies f'_i for P_i.

The objectives are Boolean!

Network formation games: quantitative objectives!





Is satisfaction really Boolean?

ALWAYS(request → EVENTUALLY grant)



Is satisfaction really Boolean?

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

The Boolean setting does not distinguish between the different ways in which a specification is satisfied.

Behavioral quality: [Almagor,Boker,Kupferman 2014]

The logics LTL[F] and LTL[D]:
multi-valued extensions of LTL.

LTL[F]:

The satisfaction value of an LTL[F] formula is in [0,1].

0: "very bad". 1: very good.

F: a set of propositional-quality operators.

A k-ary operator $f:[0,1]^k \rightarrow [0,1]$

Examples: $x \wedge y$ min(x,y), $x \vee y$ max(x,y), $\neg x$ 1-x

Semantics of LTL[F]:

[[π,ψ]] : the satisfaction value of ψ in π.

Formula	Satisfaction value
$[\![\pi, \mathtt{True}]\!]$	1
$[\![\pi, \mathtt{False}]\!]$	0
$[\![\pi, p]\!]$	1 if $p \in \pi_0$ 0 if $p \notin \pi_0$
$[\![\pi, f(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k)]\!]$	$f([\![\pi, \varphi_1]\!], \ldots, [\![\pi, \varphi_k]\!])$
$[\![\pi, \mathsf{X}\varphi_1]\!]$	$[\![\pi^1, \varphi_1]\!]$
$[\![\pi, \varphi_1 \mathsf{U} \varphi_2]\!]$	$\max_{i \geq 0}\{\min\{[\![\pi^i, \varphi_2]\!], \min_{0 \leq j < i} [\![\pi^j, \varphi_1]\!]\}\}$

Indeed only finitely many possible values

$$[[\pi, \varphi_1 U \varphi_2]] = \max_{i \geq 0} \{\min\{[[\pi^i, \varphi_2]], \min_{i > j \geq 0} \{[[\pi^j, \varphi_1]] \}\}\}$$



$$[[\pi, \varphi_1 U \varphi_2]] = \bigvee_{i \geq 0} \{ \bigwedge\{[[\pi^i, \varphi_2]], \bigwedge_{i > j \geq 0} [[\pi^j, \varphi_1]] \}\}$$

$$[[\pi,\varphi_1 U \varphi_2]] = \max_{i\geq 0}\{\min\{[[\pi^i, \varphi_2]], \min_{i>j\geq 0}\{[[\pi^j, \varphi_1]]\}\}\}$$



$$[[\pi,\varphi_1 U \varphi_2]] = \bigvee_{i\geq 0}\{\bigwedge\{[[\pi^i, \varphi_2]], \bigwedge_{i>j\geq 0}[[\pi^j, \varphi_1]]\}\}$$

Two useful quality operators:

For a parameter λ in [0,1]:

$$[[\pi, \nabla_\lambda \varphi]] = \lambda \cdot [[\pi, \varphi]].$$

$$[[\pi, \varphi_1 \oplus_\lambda \varphi_2]] = \lambda \cdot [[\pi, \varphi_1]] + (1-\lambda) \cdot [[\pi, \varphi_2]].$$

Prioritize different behaviors

$\varphi_1 \vee \nabla_{3/4}\, \varphi_2$:

If φ_1 holds, the satisfaction value is 1.
If only φ_2 holds, the satisfaction value is ¾.
If none of them holds, the satisfaction value is 0.

Consider $G(p \to Xq \vee XXq)$.

LTL[F] variants:

$$G(p \to Xq \vee \nabla_{1/2} XXq)$$

Two q's: 1
Only the first: 1
Only the second: $\frac{1}{2}$

$$G(p \to Xq \oplus_{3/4} XXq)$$

Two q's: 1
Only the first: $\frac{3}{4}$
Only the second: $\frac{1}{4}$

Back to Rational Synthesis

A stable (NE) profile $P=\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$:

for every i, if $[[P,\varphi_i]]=v$, then $[[P',\varphi_i]] \leq v$ for all profiles $P'=P[i \leftarrow f'_i]$.

Consider a profile $P=\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$.

utility(P) = sum of satisfaction values =

$=[[P,\psi]]+[[P,\varphi_1]]+ \ldots + [[P,\varphi_k]]$.

- SO: max P {utility(P)}.

Note: in NFG it was dual

- PoS: SO/ utility of best NE.

- PoA: SO / utility of worst NE.

What are they in rational synthesis?

Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative RS

PoS vs. PoA

Input: objectives ψ and $\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_k$.

Cooperative rational synthesis:

Output: a stable profile $\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$ that satisfies ψ.

best NE!

Non-cooperative rational synthesis:

Output: a strategy f_0 such that every stable profile $\langle f_0,\ldots,f_k \rangle$ satisfies ψ.

worst NE!

What are the prices of stability and anarchy in rational synthesis?

Price of Anarchy:

$P_1,\dots,P_k$ assign values to $x_1,\dots,x_k$

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $\varphi_i = \nabla_\alpha (x_i \wedge \neg x_k)$ $\alpha = (1-\varepsilon)/k-1$

$\varphi_k = \nabla_\beta (x_k \vee (x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \dots \wedge x_{k-1}))$ $\beta = \varepsilon$



SO: T T T … T F

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $(1-\varepsilon)/k-1$ φ_k: ε utility: 1

Worst NE: F F F … F T

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: 0 φ_k: ε utility: ε

PoA: SO/worst NE = $1/\varepsilon$ -- unbounded!



Price of Anarchy:

$P_1,\ldots,P_k$ assign values to $x_1,\ldots,x_k$

$\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $\varphi_i = \nabla_\alpha (x_i \wedge \neg x_k)$ $\alpha = (1-\varepsilon)/k-1$

$\varphi_k = \nabla_\beta (x_k \vee (x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \ldots \wedge x_{k-1}))$ $\beta = \varepsilon$

SO is stable --> SO is best NE.

best/worst NE is unbounded.

SO: T T T ... T F

$\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $(1-\varepsilon)/k-1$ φ_k: ε utility: 1

Cooperative RS may be unboundedly better than non-cooperative RS!

Worst NE: F F F ... F T

$\varphi_1,\ldots,\varphi_{k-1}$: 0 φ_k: ε utility: ε

PoA: SO/worst NE = $1/\varepsilon$ -- unbounded!

Price of Stability:

$P_1,\dots,P_k$ assign values to $x_1,\dots,x_k$

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $\varphi_i = \nabla_\alpha (x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \dots \wedge x_{k-1} \wedge x_k)$ $\alpha = (1-\varepsilon)/k-1$

$\varphi_k = \nabla_\beta (x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \dots \wedge x_{k-1} \wedge \neg x_k)$ $\beta = \varepsilon$

SO: T T T ... T stable?

no!

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: $(1-\varepsilon)/k-1$ φ_k: 0 utility: $1-\varepsilon$

Best NE: T T T ... T F

$\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_{k-1}$: 0 φ_k: ε utility: ε

PoS: SO/best NE = $(1-\varepsilon)/\varepsilon$ -- unbounded!

To Sum Up:

- Synthesis of open systems: winning strategy in a zero-sum game.

- Rationality assumption on the environment. Transition to non-zero-sum game.

- Classical game theory: quantitative utilities. Price of stability, price of anarchy.

- LTL[F]: quantitative specifications.

- Cooperative rational synthesis: PoS, unbounded.

- Non-cooperative rational synthesis: PoA, unbounded.

We did not see:

- Solving rational synthesis: connection with strategy logic.

- Rational verification: does S satisfy ψ in every rational? [Wooldridge, Gutierrez, Harrenstein, Marchioni, Perelli 2016]

- Fixing systems by making them stable.

- Richer settings: incomplete information, probability, other solution concepts.

Thank you