

encrypted computation *from* lattices



Hoeteck Wee



financial, medical,
customers, employees



BIG DATA



financial, medical,

customers, employees



BIG DATA

Q. privacy.




BIG DATA

Q. privacy.




BIG DATA

Q. privacy. utility?



BIG DATA

Q. privacy + utility
encrypted computation




BIG DATA

Q. privacy + utility

encrypted computation

3 notions




BIG DATA

Q. privacy + utility

encrypted computation

3 notions *from lattices*



BIG DATA

Q. privacy + utility

encrypted computation

3 notions + 1 equation

fully **homomorphic** encryption

fully homomorphic **encryption**

syntax. $\mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$, $\mathbf{dec}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$

functionality.

fully homomorphic **encryption**

syntax. $\mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$, $\mathbf{dec}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$

functionality. $\mathbf{dec}(\mathbf{sk}, \mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, x)) = x$

fully homomorphic **encryption**

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{dec}(\text{sk}, \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)) = x$

fully **homomorphic** encryption

security. $\mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{eval}} \mathbf{enc}(\mathbf{sk}, f(x))$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{eval}} \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

FHE for **circuits** from lattices

[Gentry 09, Brakerski Vaikuntanathan 11, Gentry Sahai Waters 13]

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{eval}} \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

FHE for **circuits** from **LWE**

[Gentry 09, Brakerski Vaikuntanathan 11, Gentry Sahai Waters 13]

$$(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{s}\mathbf{B} + \mathbf{e}) \approx_c \text{uniform}$$

$$\boxed{s} \quad \boxed{\mathbf{B}} \quad + \quad \boxed{\mathbf{e}}$$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{eval}} \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

FHE for **circuits** from **LWE**

[Gentry 09, Brakerski Vaikuntanathan 11, Gentry Sahai Waters 13]

fully **homomorphic** encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

fully **homomorphic** encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1


t
over \mathbb{Z}_q
 sk

fully **homomorphic** encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1



fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} \boxed{x \mathbf{t}} \\ \text{t: eigenvector} \end{array}$$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}} \\ \text{t: eigenvector} \end{array}$$

$$\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_1), \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_2) \stackrel{?}{\mapsto} \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_1 + x_2), \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_1 x_2)$$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \dots = x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 = x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

LHS = $x_1 \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 = \dots$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 = x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

polynomials: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 + \mathbf{A}_3 \mathbf{A}_4) = (x_1 x_2 + x_3 x_4)\mathbf{t}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

1

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} = \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 = x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

polynomials: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n}_{\mathbf{A}_f} = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)\mathbf{t}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

2

+ noise

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) = (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 = x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

2 + noise

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) \approx (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

– *proof.* small + small = small

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

2 + noise

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) \approx (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 \not\approx x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

– *proof.* small $\cdot \mathbf{A}_2 = \text{big}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

3 A_i small

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) \approx (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 \not\approx x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

– *proof.* small $\cdot \mathbf{A}_2 = \text{big}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

3 A_i small

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) \approx (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$

multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 \approx x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

- *proof.* $\text{small} \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 = \text{small}$

fully homomorphic encryption

security. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x)$ hides x

functionality. $\text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \mapsto \text{enc}(\text{sk}, f(x))$

3 A_i small


$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x_i) \end{array} \quad \approx \quad \boxed{x_i \mathbf{t}}$$

addition: $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) \approx (x_1 + x_2)\mathbf{t}$


multiplication: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 \approx x_1 x_2 \mathbf{t}$

polynomials: $\mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n}_{\mathbf{A}_f} \approx f(x_1, \dots, x_n)\mathbf{t}$

fully **homomorphic** encryption



fully **homomorphic** encryption



$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)}_{t}$$

fully homomorphic encryption

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{t} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \boxed{A} \quad \approx \quad x \quad \boxed{t} \\ \text{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \end{array}$$

2 A hides x
3 A small

$$\underbrace{(s - 1)}_t \quad \begin{pmatrix} B \\ sB + e \end{pmatrix} \quad \approx \mathbf{0}$$


fully **homomorphic** encryption

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \boxed{\mathbf{A}} \quad \approx \quad x \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \mathbf{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \end{array}$$

2 A hides x
3 A small

$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)}_{\mathbf{t}} \quad \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{sB} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{I} \right) \approx x\mathbf{t}$$

fully **homomorphic** encryption



$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)}_{t} \quad \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{sB + e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{I} \right) \approx xt$$


fully **homomorphic** encryption

$$\begin{array}{c} \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \text{sk} \end{array} \quad \boxed{\mathbf{A}} \quad \approx \quad x \boxed{\mathbf{t}} \\ \mathbf{enc}(\text{sk}, x) \end{array}$$

2 A hides x
3 A small

$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)}_{\mathbf{t}} \quad \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{sB} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{I} \right) \approx x\mathbf{t}$$

fully homomorphic encryption



fully homomorphic encryption



$$\mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{G} \\ \mathbf{I} & 2\mathbf{I} & 4\mathbf{I} & \cdots & \frac{q}{2}\mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}$$


LSB
⋮
MSB

fully homomorphic encryption




$$\boxed{\mathbf{M}} = \boxed{\mathbf{G}} \left(\begin{matrix} \mathbf{I} & 2\mathbf{I} & 4\mathbf{I} & \cdots & \frac{q}{2}\mathbf{I} \end{matrix} \right) \boxed{\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M})}$$

fully **homomorphic** encryption




$$\underbrace{(s - 1)}_t \quad \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ s\mathbf{B} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{I} \right) \approx xt$$

fully **homomorphic** encryption




$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)}_{\mathbf{t}} \mathbf{G} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1} \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{sB} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x \mathbf{I} \right) \approx x \mathbf{t}$$

fully **homomorphic** encryption




$$\underbrace{(\underbrace{s - 1}_{t}) \mathbf{G}}_{\text{new } t} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1} \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ s\mathbf{B} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x \mathbf{I} \right) \approx xt$$

fully homomorphic encryption



$$\underbrace{(\underbrace{s - 1}_{t})\mathbf{G}}_{\text{new } t} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1} \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ s\mathbf{B} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{G} \right) \approx xt\mathbf{G}$$

fully **homomorphic** encryption



$$\underbrace{(\mathbf{s} - 1)\mathbf{G}}_{\mathbf{t}} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1} \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} \\ \mathbf{sB} + \mathbf{e} \end{pmatrix} + x\mathbf{G} \right) \approx xt$$

small, small, ...

small, small, ...

- $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_1)\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_2) \Rightarrow \text{small} \approx \text{small}^{\deg(f)}$

small, small, ...

- $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_1)\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_2) \Rightarrow \text{small} \approx \text{small}^{\deg(f)}$
- $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_1\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{M}_2)) \Rightarrow \text{small} \approx \text{small}^{\log \deg(f)}$

small, small, ...

circuit



intermediate \times intermediate


$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n^{\text{depth}} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

small, small, ...

circuit



branching program




intermediate \times intermediate

$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n^{\text{depth}} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

small, small, ...


circuit



intermediate \times intermediate

$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n^{\text{depth}} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

branching program



intermediate \times input

small, small, ...


circuit



intermediate \times intermediate

$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n^{\text{depth}} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

branching program




intermediate \times input


$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n \cdot \text{length} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

small, small, ...

circuit
depth $O(\log n)$



branching program
length $\text{poly}(n)$




intermediate \times intermediate

$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n^{\text{depth}} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$


intermediate \times input

$$\text{small}_{\text{output}} = n \cdot \text{length} \cdot \text{small}_{\text{input}}$$

small, small, ...



small, small, ...



log-depth circuits with **polynomial** hardness [BV14, AP14, GVW13]

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i = x_i \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} = f(x) \mathbf{t}$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

for any polynomial f , $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \qquad \qquad \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

[**GSI13**, **BGG+14**, **GVW15**, **BCTW16**, **MPI2**]

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

[**GSI13**, **BGG+14**, **GVW15**, **BCTW16**, **MPI2**]

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

[GSW13, BGG+14, GVW15, BCTW16, MPI2]

claim. **lemma II** \Rightarrow **lemma I**

proof. multiply both sides by \mathbf{t}

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle + and \times

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{I}] \underbrace{\left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \end{array} \right)}_{\mathbf{H}_{+,x_1,x_2}} = (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) - (x_1 + x_2) \mathbf{I}$$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{I}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}}_{\mathbf{H}_{+,x_1,x_2}} = (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) - (x_1 + x_2) \mathbf{I}$$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{I}] \underbrace{\left(\begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \end{array} \right)}_{\mathbf{H}_{\times, x_1, x_2}} = \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{I}$$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{I}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A}_2 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{A}_n \end{pmatrix}}_{\mathbf{H}_{\times, x_1, x_2}} = \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{I}$$

eigenvectors, revisited

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_i - x_i \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot (\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{0}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{I}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A}_2 \\ x_1 \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}}_{\mathbf{H}_{\times, x_1, x_2}} = \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{I}$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i = x_i \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} = f(x) \mathbf{t}$

lemma II. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{I} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{I}$$


$$\boxed{\mathbf{A}_i}, \boxed{\mathbf{I}} \mapsto \boxed{\mathbf{A}_i}, \boxed{\mathbf{G}}$$

eigenvectors, revisited^{*}

lemma I. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i = x_i \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} = f(x) \mathbf{t}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$



eigenvectors, revisited^{*}

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

corollary. small $\mathbf{H}_{f,x} \Rightarrow$ robust to noise

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

corollary. small $\mathbf{H}_{f,x} \Rightarrow$ robust to noise

$$(\mathbf{s}[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] + \mathbf{e}) \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} \approx \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G})$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

proof. handle + and \times

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

proof. handle + and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{G}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}}_{\text{small}} = (\mathbf{A}_1 + \mathbf{A}_2) - (x_1 + x_2) \mathbf{G}$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{G}] \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A}_2 \\ x_1 \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix} \underbrace{=}_{\text{small?}} \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{A}_2 - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{G}$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{G}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_2) \\ x_1 \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}}_{\text{small}} = \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_2) - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{G}$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

proof. handle $+$ and \times

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{A}_2 - x_2 \mathbf{G}] \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_2) \\ x_1 \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}}_{\text{small}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_2)}_{\mathbf{A}_\times} - x_1 x_2 \mathbf{G}$$

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

applications.

fully homomorphic enc [GSW]

attribute-based enc [BGGHNSVV]

fully homomorphic sig [GVW]

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

applications.

\mathbf{A}_f

$\mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

fully homomorphic enc [GSW]

eval output

correctness

attribute-based enc [BGGHNSVV]

fully homomorphic sig [GVW]

eigenvectors, revisited*

lemma I*. $\mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \approx x_i \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G} \Rightarrow \mathbf{t} \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{A}_f}_{f(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n)} \approx f(x) \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{G}$

lemma II*. $\forall \mathbf{A}_i, \forall x, \forall f, \exists \text{ small } \mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

applications.

\mathbf{A}_f

$\mathbf{H}_{f,x}$

fully homomorphic enc [**GSW**]

eval output

correctness

attribute-based enc [**BGGHNSVV**]

keygen

decryption

fully homomorphic sig [**GVW**]

verification

homomorphic sign

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 + x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n + x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f + f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

today. lattices \Rightarrow **FHE** for circuits with **dec** $\approx \langle \text{sk}, \text{ct} \rangle$

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

today. lattices \Rightarrow **FHE** for circuits with **dec** $\approx \langle \text{sk}, \text{ct} \rangle$

“ XXX for fhe.dec \Rightarrow XXX for circuits ” [GVW12, GKPVZ13, GVW15]

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

today. lattices \Rightarrow **FHE** for circuits with **dec** $\approx \langle \text{sk}, \text{ct} \rangle$

“ XXX for $\approx \text{lin} \Rightarrow$ XXX for circuits ” [GVW12, GKPVZ13, **GVW15**]

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

today. lattices \Rightarrow **FHE** for circuits with **dec** $\approx \langle \text{sk}, \text{ct} \rangle$

“ XXX for $\approx \text{lin} \Rightarrow$ XXX for circuits ” [GVW12, GKPVZ13, **GVW15**]

starting point for **obfuscation – tomorrow**

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

tue. obfuscation

wed. another way to encode computation into lattices

[**GGH15**, **KW16**, **CC17**, **GKW17**, **WZ17**, **GKW18**, **CVW18**, ...]

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

tue. obfuscation

wed. another way to encode computation into lattices

thu. MPC, LWE, FHE

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

tue. obfuscation

wed. another way to encode computation into lattices

thu. MPC, LWE, FHE

fri. quantum crypto

conclusion

today. lattices \Rightarrow **encrypted computation**

$$[\mathbf{A}_1 - x_1 \mathbf{G} \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{A}_n - x_n \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{H}_{f,x} = \mathbf{A}_f - f(x) \mathbf{G}$$

tue. obfuscation

wed. another way to encode computation into lattices

thu. MPC, LWE, FHE

fri. quantum crypto

// thank you & enjoy!