


# Quantum Proofs of Knowledge

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# Post Quantum Crypto

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- Post Quantum Crypto
    - Classical crypto
    - Secure against quantum computers
  - Needs:
    - Quantum hard problems (e.g., lattice crypto)
    - New security proofs
-  **This talk**

# Zero Knowledge Proofs



Prover

Graphs  $G$  and  $H$  are isomorphic



Verifier

Permute  $G$

Permuted graph  $J$



$G$  or  $H$




Pick  $G$  or  $H$

Iso between  $J$  and  $G$  or  $J$  and  $H$



# Zero-knowledge: how to show?


- Given only malicious verifier:  
simulate interaction  $\Rightarrow$  nothing learned



- Quantum case: Rewinding = state copying!

# Watrous' quantum rewinding

- Cannot copy state  $\rightarrow$  have to restore it




- Variant of amplitude amplification

[Watrous 09]

# Limitations of Watrous' rewinding

- Oblivious rewinding:  
When simulator rewinds, he forgets everything
- Success probability independent of initial state



Intuition: success carries no info about  $|\Psi\rangle$

# Quantum ZK solved?

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- Watrous' rewinding covers many important ZK proofs
- But not all...  
E.g., graph non-isomorphism.
- And not: Proofs of knowledge



# Proofs of knowledge

- Example: Want to prove age (e.g., e-passport)



**Prover**

I know a government-signature on  
document stating that I'm  $\geq 18$



**Verifier**



# Proofs of knowledge – definition

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If prover is successful:

~~prover knows witness~~

~~could output witness~~

there is an extractor that,

given provers state,


outputs witness

## Definition – more formally

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
- There is a poly time extractor  $E$
- Such that for any malicious prover  $P^*$
- If  $P^*$  makes the verifier accept with probability  $\alpha$
- Then  $E^{P^*}$  outputs witness with probability  $\Omega(\text{poly}(\alpha - \text{const}))$ .

# Constructing extractors




“Special soundness”: Two different responses allow to compute witness

- E.g., isomorphisms from  $J$  to  $G$  and  $H$  give isomorphism between  $G$  and  $H$




# Quantum extractors?

- Quantum case:  
Rewinding = copying. Not possible
- Watrous' "oblivious" rewinding does not work:  
Forgets response 1




# Canonical extractor




# Canonical extractor (ctd.)

- Does it work?
- Measuring “response 1” disturbs state
- Rewinding fails...



# Making extraction work


- Thought experiment:  
“response” was only 1 bit
- Then: measuring “res 1”  
disturbs only moderately
- Extraction would work



# Making extraction work (ctd.)

- Idea: Make “response” effectively be 1 bit
- **“Strict soundness”**: For any challenge, exists at most 1 valid response
- Given strict soundness, canonical extractor works!

OPEN  
PROBLEM





# Main result

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Assume: Special soundness, strict soundness

Then


$$\Pr[\textit{extract}] \geq (\Pr[\textit{verify}] - 1/\sqrt{\#\textit{challenges}})^2$$

- Classical: no  $\sqrt{\quad}$ , exponent 2.
- Computational security?



# Achieving strict soundness

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- Graph Isomorphism proof does not have strict soundness
    - Unless graphs are “rigid”
- 
- Discrete log proof has (but uninteresting quantumly)
  - Alternative trick (for #challenges poly):
    - Commit to all responses in advance
    - Need: “Strict binding” for unique unveil

# Plugging things together


- Proof system for Hamiltonian cycles
- Commitments from injective OWFs

Assuming injective quantum OWFs,  
quantum ZK proofs of knowledge  
exist for all NP languages


**OPEN  
PROBLEM**

Caveat: No candidates for injective OWFs known.


# Using extractors (I)



## Proof:



# Using extractors (II)



- Success prob. too low
- Repeat.
- Quantum?
- Watrous? No!
- Success prob. not indep. of state.

**OPEN PROBLEM**

# Conclusions

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- ZK and proof of knowledge  
→ New challenges in quantum case
- Solved in basic settings, many unsolved issues  
(Challenge: Graph non-isomorphism is ZK)
- Same problems likely to occur in more complex settings  
(e.g., multiparty computation)


# I thank for your attention



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# Random Oracles

- Model hash function as **random function H**
- Many useful proof techniques





# Limited programming of RO

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- Want to give answer  $H(x)=y_{special}$
- Don't know which  $x$  is queried
- Solution: Put  $y_{special}$  in many (not too many) images of  $H$
- With noticeable probability: Exactly one query hits  $y_{special}$
- Even works quantumly [Zhandry 12]

# Necessity of strict soundness

WORK IN  
PROGRESS!

- Given a set  $S$
- can encode it as a quantum state  $|\Psi\rangle$
- s.t. for any set  $Z$
- you find one  $x_1 \in S \cap Z$
- but not two  $x_1, x_2 \in S$

