Matching Uses and Protections for Government Data Releases

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Abstract

In this talk we describe work-in progress that aims to align emerging methods of data protections with research uses. We use the *American Community Survey* as an exemplar case for examining the range of ways that government data is used for research. We identify the range of research uses by combining evidence of use from multiple sources including research articles; national and local media coverage; social media; and research proposals. We then employ human and computer-assisted coding methods to characterize the range of data analysis methodologies that researchers employ. Then, building on previous work cataloging that surveys and characterizes computational and technical controls for privacy, we match these methods to available and emerging privacy and data security controls. Our preliminary analysis suggests that tiered-access to government data will be necessary to support current and new research in the social and health sciences.

Attribution Statement

Co-Conspirators:

- Cavan Capps, U.S. Census
- Zachary Lizee, U. Mass Boston
- Dylan Sam, Brown U.

Project Collaborators:

• Urs Gasser, David O'Brien, Ron Prevost, Salil Vadhan, and the <u>Harvard University Privacy Tools Project</u>

Sponsors:

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Disclaimer

These opinions are my own, they are not the opinions of my employers, collaborators, or project funders.

Secondary disclaimer:

"It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future!"

- Attributed to Woody Allen, Yogi Berra, Niels Bohr, Vint Cerf, Winston Churchill, Confucius, Disreali [sic], Freeman Dyson, Cecil B. Demille, Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Edgar R. Fiedler, Bob Fourer, Sam Goldwyn, Allan Lamport, Groucho Marx, Dan Quayle, George Bernard Shaw, Casey Stengel, Will Rogers, M. Taub, Mark Twain, Kerr L. White, etc.



Related Work

- Altman, M., Wood, A., O'Brien, D. R., Vadhan, S., & Gasser, U. (2015). Towards a modern approach to privacy-aware government data releases. *Berkeley Technology Law Journal*, 30(3), 1967-2072. <u>https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38FG17</u>
- Altman, Micah and Capps, Cavan and Prevost, Ronald, Location Confidentiality and Official Surveys (March 31, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757737 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757737
- Altman, M., Wood, A., O'Brien, D. R., & Gasser, U., Practical approaches to big data privacy over time, *International Data Privacy Law*, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 29–51, <u>https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx027</u>

Broader Context Of Use and Risk

for Government Information


Functions of Government Information

- Official decision & communications
- Broader social benefit (research and business uses)
- Public transparency and accountability




Harm Depends on Privacy & Sensitivity

Illustrating how to choose privacy controls that are consistent with the uses, threats, and vulnerabilities at each lifecycle stage



Changes in Data Collection, Environment Change Identifiability, Threats and Vulnerabilities



Example temporal risk factors for big data

	Identifiability	Threats (sensitivity)	Vulnerabilities (sensitivity)
Age	Small decrease	Moderate increase	Moderate decrease
Period	Small increase	Moderate increase	No substantial evidence of effect
Frequency	Large increase	Small increase	No substantial evidence of effect

Approaches to Managing Informational Harm



Informational controls

 Procedural, technical, educational, economic, and legal means for enhancing privacy can be applied at different stages


	Procedural	Economic	Educational	Legal	Technical
Access/Release	Access controls; Consent; Expert panels; Individual privacy settings; Presumption of openness vs. privacy; Purpose specification; Registration; Restrictions on use by data controller; Risk assessments	Access/Use fees (for data controller or subjects); Property rights assignment	Data asset registers; Notice; Transparency	Integrity and accuracy requirements; Data use agreements (contract with data recipient)/ Terms of service	Authentication; Computable policy; Differential privacy; Encryption (incl. Functional; Homomorphic); Interactive query systems; Secure multiparty computation



Sequencing controls

 Review of uses, threats, and vulnerabilities as information is used over time

Select appropriate
 controls at each stage



What do technical controls control?

• Controls on computation --

limit the direct computations that can be meaningfully performed

- Common: file-level encryption, interactive-analysis systems (model servers)
- Emerging: functional encryption, homomorphic encryption, secure public ledgers, personal data stores

• Controls on inference

limit how learning from computations about the observed units

- Common: redaction, SDL
- Emerging: differentially private mechanisms

• Controls on purpose

limit the domain of human activity to which inferences are applied.

- Common: legal mechanisms
- Emerging: executable policy languages; machine actionable taxonomies, personal data stores

Examples of appropriate privacy and security controls based on the risk drivers and intended mode of analysis identified a big data use case.

		Big Data Risk Drivers Lower Risk —————→ Higher Risk			ligher Risk
		Age, Period, Sample Size, Population Diversity	High Dimensional	High Frequency	High Dimensional & High Frequency
Intended Mode of Analysis	Population- level Statistical Analysis	Notice, Consent, Terms of Service; Formal Oversight	Differential Privacy; Formal Oversight		Secure Data Enclave/Model Server; Restricted Access; Formal Oversight
	Individual Analytics	bervice, romar eversight	Personal Data Stores; Blockchain Audit Logs; Secure Multiparty Computation; Formal Oversight		

Characterizing Traces of Use

C, Find reports & more	New 15	Nov 28	Dw: 13	Dec 2	,
+ seriormening Users Flow	Primity Detension: Guery Other -		to the second		
Accuisition	Secondary timenates +			Q, atte	10 E 2 9 55
Acdaence.	Query	Improvesions 🗸 🗸	Cleas 0	Average Position	CTR
Overview + All Traffic		209 % of Total 1.74% (17,000)	10 % of Torse 11,11% (90)	61 Aug for View 200 (-73.025)	4.78%
+ AdWords	1. how to fix your marriage	35 (16.70%)	0 (0.00%)	110	0.009
Search Engine Optimization	2. classy gifts for men	12 (1.74%)	0 (240%)	41	0.009
Queries	 easy fun christmas coakies 	12 (5.74%)	0 (0.00%)	40	0.001
Landing Pages Geographical Su • Social	4. "ways to make money from home"	5 (2.39%)	0 (2.075)	190	0.009
	5. "work at home mores"	5 (2.30%)	0 (0.00%)	180	0.00
	0. 25 days of christmas activities	5 (2.99%)	0 (0.00%)	6.0	0.001
+ Campaigns	7. 25 days of christmas activities for kids	5 (2.39%)	5 (93.00%)	7.6	100.001
Behavio:	8. 25 days of christmes family activities	5 (2.38%)	0 (0.00%)	6.6	6.601
Overview	9. 25 days of christmas stories	6 (2.39%)	6 (90.00%)	27	100.003
Behavior Flow	10. amazing christmas cookies	5 (2.39%)	(#01.0) D	28	0.001
- Sile Content				Stowneys 10	Colox 1 1-10 ol 23 4 >
AI Pages		© 2015 Goople Analytics Hame T			

Access Logs



Published Analyses



Media and Social Media Mentions

Matching Uses and Protections

(Exploratory, Preliminary)



Identifying	Current	Modes of Dissemination	1
	lished mates	Official IndicatorsPre-computed published tables	
Quick	Lookups	 Interactive queries to find a single number or table Based on pre-computed tables 	
	nic Tables Naps	 Public interactive servers Based on public use tabulations or micro-data 	
	ic Use lations	 Aggregated to pre-defined geographical or logical units Processed statistical disclosure limitation methods Based on protected micro-data 	
	ic Use p-data	 Processed with SDL: deidentification, sampling, synthetic data In rare cases, synthetic data used 	
	ected o-data	 Based on protected micro-data Possibly identified Available within Research Data Centers 	

What could this inform? .

- Data prep
 - External data sources used
 - Cleaning level
 - Linking level
- Statistical computing approach
 - Sum queries/univariate method
 - Linear models/GLM
 - Likelihood
 - Bayesian estimates
- Diagnostics
 - Summary diagnostics
 - Sensitivity analysis
 - Individual outliers

- Desired purpose
 - Research
 - Policy
 - Commercial
 - Education
- Data Characteristics
 - $\circ \qquad \text{What ACS measures used}$
 - ACS Unit of analysis
 - Study unity of analysis
 - Time dimensions
 - Other Structure
 - Network
 - Textual
 - Spatial
 - Video
- Presentation characteristics
 - Summary/regression
 - Individual cases/plots

- Replication
 - Results
 - Full

Conclusions and/or Provocations

Summary

- One size does not fit all
 - -- anticipate that tiered access will be necessary to address major uses
- Government data supports several objectives
 - -- government decision & communication; broader social benefit (research and economy); transparency and accountability
- Informational controls vary in compatibility -controls should be matched to objectives and modes of analysis



Provocations & Vigorous Hand Waving

- Discovery research (currently) requires access beyond limits of formal protections

 empirically guided exploratory research, theory generation, process tracing, novel syntheses (etc.) are incompletely understood and formalized
- A representative use isn't
 - -- need to consider multiple uses and tensions between these to get substantial social benefit avoid substantial harms
- Worst-case analyses aren't
 - -- some formal (DP) and legal analysis (Title 13) take worst case approach to inferential risk, but...
 - -- apply average-case analysis to use/utility reduction
 - -- are optimistic about operational/implementation risks

Non-temporal risk factors of big data also affect privacy risk components in different ways.

High-dimensional data pose challenges for traditional privacy approaches such as de-identification, and can support new uses of data that were unforeseen at the time of collection.

Broader analytic uses, such as the use of data for personalized classification, and both traditional and modern approaches to de-identification fail to protect against learning facts about populations that could be used to discriminate.

Increases in sample size and diversity lead to heightened risks that a target individual is included, vulnerable populations are included, and a wide range of threats are plausible.

Questions? Observations? Arguments?*

Now (10 minutes)

or

Later

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*£1 for a five minute argument, but only £8 for a course of ten.